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The exploitation-exploration (EE) trade-off describes how, when making a decision, an 
organism must often choose between a safe alternative with a known pay-off, and one or 
more riskier alternatives with uncertain pay-offs. Recently, the concept of the EE trade-off 
has been extended to the examination of how organisms distribute limited attentional 
resources between several stimuli. This work suggests that when the rules governing the 
environment are certain, participants learn to “exploit” by attending preferentially to cues that 
provide the most information about upcoming events. However, when the rules are uncertain, 
people “explore” by increasing their attention to all cues that may provide information to help 
in predicting upcoming events. In the current study, we examine how uncertainty affects the 
EE trade-off in attention using a contextual two-armed bandit task, where participants explore 
with both their attention and their choice behavior. We find evidence for an influence of 
uncertainty on the EE trade-off in both choice and attention. These findings provide support 
to the idea of an EE trade-off in attention, and that uncertainty is a primary motivator for 
exploration in both choice and attentional allocation.  





When making a decision about the behavior to perform in a given situation, an agent can 
choose to use its current knowledge to maximize short-term gains, or search for new 
information to maximize long-term gains (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007). Imagine a person 
eating at their favorite restaurant, where they can choose to either order a meal they have had 
before (exploiting their knowledge about existing choice values), or try something on the 
menu they have never eaten before (exploring the value of a new choice). Such exploitation-
exploration (EE) trade-offs occur frequently in daily life, such as when deciding the route to 
travel in a car, or making financial investments (Mehlhorn et al., 2015).  
Until recently, research on EE trade-offs had been restricted to the domain of choice 
behavior. As in the restaurant example above, this involves studying how decision makers 
allocate their choices between several alternatives. These studies have shown that uncertainty 
is key to motivating exploration of choice responses (Knox et al., 2012; Speekenbrink & 
Konstantinidis, 2015). Beesley, Nguyen, Pearson, and Le Pelley (2015) recently showed that 
uncertainty can also affect attentional processing in a manner consistent with the EE trade-
off. In a modified version of the ‘learned predictiveness design’ (Le Pelley & McLaren, 
2003), on each trial participants were presented two of four possible cues (cues A, B, X, & Y) 
and were required to select one of two possible responses (response 1 or response 2). 
Participants were then told whether their response was correct or incorrect. On each trial, one 
of the cues (A or B) predicted the correct response to make (the “predictive cue”), and the 
other cue (X or Y) was irrelevant (the “non-predictive cue”), providing no information on 
which response was correct. Critically, the certainty with which predictive cues indicated the 
correct response varied across groups of participants. For participants in the “certain” 
condition, the relationship between the predictive cue and the accuracy of the response was 
perfect: whenever cue A was present, response 1 was the correct response, and whenever cue 





condition, the relationship between the predictive cue and the correct response was 
probabilistic. For example, if cue A was present, response 1 would be correct on 67% of 
trials, with response 2 correct on the remainder.1 
Beesley et al. (2015) used eye-gaze measurements to assess how participants attended 
to the cues in the two different groups. They found participants in the certain group would on 
average spend a greater proportion of the trial time looking at the predictive cue compared to 
the non-predictive cue (see also Le Pelley, Beesley & Griffiths, 2011; Rehder & Hoffman, 
2005). They argued this reflected an exploitation strategy: in a stable, certain environment, 
participants directed attention towards the best available cue to exploit their knowledge of the 
contingencies. It was also found that participants in the uncertain group spent a greater 
proportion of the trial time looking at cues overall than participants in the certain group. 
Beesley et al. argued that this reflected an exploration strategy: participants faced with an 
uncertain environment opted to spend more time attending to cues, presumably in an attempt 
to gain new information from the cues that could allow for more accurate response selection 
in the future. 
Beesley et al. (2015) also tracked participants’ choices during the task. While 
participants in the certain condition generally learned to choose the response that led to a 
correct outcome on nearly 100% of trials, participants in the uncertain condition typically 
engaged in a probability matching strategy, matching their responses to the probability of 
receiving a correct outcome for each response (Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002). While 
this seems an intuitive strategy, it leads to a suboptimal level of performance; the optimal 
                                                          
1 ‘Uncertainty’ here refers to the stochastic nature of observed outcomes, such that the outcome of an event is 
unknown beforehand (e.g., will a flip of this coin land on heads or tails?), rather than uncertainty about the 
process that generates outcomes, which can come to be known over time (e.g., an observer can learn that the 





strategy under these conditions is to always select the response that is successful on the 
majority of trials (Shanks et al., 2002).  
Beesley et al. (2015) suggested that probability matching under uncertain conditions 
may reflect exploratory behavior in choice. Linking this to their attentional findings, they 
proposed that under conditions of uncertainty, participants explored with both their responses 
(by probability matching) and their attention (by increasing gaze time to cues) 
simultaneously. While exploring with both attention and responses can eventually contribute 
to receiving better outcomes, this exploration reflects different aspects of behavior in the task. 
When participants explore by changing response strategies, we assume they are exploring in 
the sense of learning about the value of the outcome for each choice. In contrast, when 
participants explore by increasing their attention to cues, we assume they are doing so to 
encode more information about the stimuli, to assist in learning the usefulness of each cue in 
predicting the outcome.  
One issue with this explanation is that participants in Beesley et al.’s (2015) study 
received feedback to indicate which response was correct on each trial, regardless of the 
response that was made. Therefore, while participants might have been motivated to explore 
the cues for new information under uncertain conditions, there was no logical reason to try 
different responses in the task. This is clearly at odds with the standard EE trade-off problem: 
since participants received information about the value of both responses (after trying only 
one), they could explore (gain new information about the different choices) and exploit (pick 
the best-known choice) simultaneously, removing any trade-off between the two behaviors.  
Another important facet of Beesley et al.’s (2015) procedure was that in their task, the 
difference in the long-run reward value of the optimal and suboptimal response was 





accounted for why participants selected the optimal response less often in the uncertain 
condition (Herrnstein, 1961; Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993), without needing to 
appeal to uncertainty as a motivator. Indeed, Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan 
(2006) have previously argued that, for designs where rewards are uncertain, simple choice 
rules that compare the relative value of different responses can provide an adequate account 
of exploration in choice behavior. As such, since average reward value differed markedly in 
the two conditions of Beesley et al.’s task, we cannot determine whether it was the 
uncertainty of the task, or the relative value of the responses, that motivated participants to 
make more suboptimal choices and show an increased level of attention to cues.  
To address the issues highlighted above, we assessed exploratory behaviour in both 
choice and attention using a contextual two-armed bandit task (Schulz, Konstantinidis, & 
Speekenbrink, 2018), in which participants are given a free choice of two responses, and are 
told how many points they earned for making that response. The value of each response is 
determined by the context in which the decision is made, which is usually indicated through 
some explicit visual cue. Importantly, this task used a limited-feedback procedure: while 
participants were told the outcome of the response they made, they were not told what they 
would have received if they had made the alternative response. Hence, in this task we can 
monitor choice as a direct index of participants’ exploration of the value of the different 
responses.  
In the contextual two-armed bandit task, uncertainty can be manipulated by adjusting 
the variability of the payout produced by each response (Speekenbrink & Konstantinidis, 
2015). Notably, this method allows us to introduce uncertainty without needing to change the 
mean value of each option. As an example, imagine a two-armed bandit task where selecting 
Response 1 always gives 10 points, and Response 2 gives between 4 and 16 points (drawing 





possible scores as the reward for response 2, there is now uncertainty in the specific outcome 
that will be produced when response 2 is chosen. However, responses 1 and 2 have the same 
objective mean value, so neither arm is (on average) better than the other. 
The contextual two-armed bandit task therefore solves both of the issues we have 
raised with the Beesley et al. (2015) task. In their task, participants received full feedback on 
each trial as to what response was optimal on that trial, eliminating the need to actively 
explore different responses. As the proposed task has feedback regarding only the selected 
response, participants are required to intentionally explore the different responses to learn the 
best response to make for a given set of cues. Furthermore, by manipulating uncertainty as 
the variability associated with a reward (while holding average reward value constant), we 
can compare performance under certainty/uncertainty in which the two conditions are 
matched in terms of the overall objective reward that can be earned, and in the expected value 
of optimal and suboptimal response options on each trial.2 If participants show greater 
suboptimal responding, and greater attention to cues, under conditions of uncertainty in this 
task, we can conclude that participants explore more due to uncertainty, and not the 
difference in reward value between optimal and suboptimal response options.  
In summary, the current study aimed to assess whether uncertain learning situations 
increased exploration in attentional allocation in a limited-feedback task where participants 
were also required to explore the different response options as well as the usefulness of 
                                                          
2 While we matched (objective) average reward in the certain/uncertain conditions, this did not necessarily mean 
that subjective value (utility) was exactly matched, since reward may be non-linearly related to utility. That said, 
between-conditions differences in utility were presumably smaller in this procedure than in previous research 
(Beesley et al., 2015), which had large between-conditions differences. Moreover, given the standard 
assumption of a negatively accelerated utility function (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the utility difference 
between optimal and suboptimal responses would be larger for our uncertain condition than the certain 
condition. To anticipate, our finding of smaller differences in choice behavior and attention for the uncertain 






different cues. In doing so, we can begin to unpack how choice behavior and attention may 
interact in the EE trade-off.  
Method 
Participants  
Forty-four UNSW students (31 identified as female, 13 as male, age M = 19.4, SD = 2.2 
years) participated for course credit. Participants were randomly allocated to the certain (n = 
22) and uncertain (n = 22) conditions. Though a power analysis suggested 15 participants per 
group would be sufficient to observe a between-condition difference in proportion of 
attention (the smallest effect of interest, ηp
2 = .28, β = .99), we tested 44 participants to avoid 
the possibility that effect sizes were overestimated in Beesley et al. (2015). The experiment 
was approved by the UNSW Sydney Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel (Psychology). 
Three participants in the certain condition had no recorded fixations on cue stimuli on over 
50% of trials, and an eye-tracker error meant one participant in the uncertain condition had no 
eye-tracking data. These participants were excluded from the eye-gaze analysis (we note that 
including these participants in eye-tracking analyses—or excluding them from analyses of 
choice behavior—did not alter the pattern of results or the conclusions drawn). MATLAB 
code for the experiment and all raw data are available via the Open Science Framework 
(OSF) at https://osf.io/kjz59/?view_only=6cfdb8ab656e44639ae28348f6749299. 
We note for completeness that two further conditions were also run (n = 23 and 22); 
these conditions were a conceptual replication of the procedure of Beesley et al. (2015). The 
replication was successful; for brevity, a report on this replication can be found at the OSF 






The experiment was programmed using MATLAB with Psychophysics Toolbox extensions 
(Kleiner et al., 2007), presented on the 23-inch monitor (1920×1080 pixels, 60 Hz) of a Tobii 
TX-300 eye-tracker (sample rate 300 Hz). Participants used a chinrest positioned ~55 cm 
from the screen. Responses were “up” and “down” arrow keys. Four stylized tarot cards 
(504×360 pixels) were used as cue stimuli. The two cards shown on each trial were presented 
to the left and right of the screen (centers 1152 pixels apart). Feedback was presented 
centrally.  
Design  
Table 1 shows the relationship between cue-compounds and response outcomes for the two 
between-subject conditions. Uncertainty was manipulated via the variability associated with 
objective reward values for the different responses. For all participants, cues A and B were 
useful in predicting the best response to make on each trial. For participants in the certain 
condition, the presence of cue A meant response 1 yielded a high reward (15) on every trial, 
while response 2 yielded a low reward (10) on every trial. The opposite was true for cue B. In 
the uncertain condition, cues A and B were useful in predicting which response would yield 
the higher reward on the majority of trials (the optimal response). However, while the mean 
values of the high-value and low-value rewards across trials were 15 and 10 points 
respectively, the specific reward on each trial was drawn from a uniform distribution with a 
range of 13 points. For example, if the participant made the optimal response, the reward they 
received on that trial ranged between 9 and 21 points (U{9, 21}). If they made the alternate 
response, the reward ranged from 4 to 16 points (U{4, 16}). In both conditions, cues X and Y 
were non-predictive: the presence of either of these cues provided no information on the 






Participants were instructed they would play a card game in which they viewed two cards and 
betted “up” or “down”. They could use feedback to learn how the cards related to responses 
and rewards, to maximize their accumulated points. Participants were informed that the top 
two performers (based on accumulated points) would receive $20. 
On each trial, a central black fixation cross appeared for 1 second, after which the two 
cards appeared. Participants had unlimited time to view the stimuli and make a response. 
Feedback was then presented for 1.5 seconds, showing the number of points earned and the 
total points accumulated. The next trial began after an inter-trial interval of 1.5 seconds. 
Participants were given three self-timed breaks, spaced evenly throughout the task. 
The experiment consisted of 256 trials, split into 8 epochs of 32 trials. Every 8 trials, 
each compound of cues (AX, AY, BX, BY) was presented twice, with the left-right spatial 
positioning of the two cues counterbalanced across these two presentations. Trial order within 
these 8 trials was random, with the constraint that the same compound could not be presented 
on consecutive trials. The sequence of rewards for each response was generated at the start of 
the procedure. We constrained the sequence to ensure that both groups had the same average 
reward for each response (i.e., 15 for the optimal response, 10 for the suboptimal response). 
This was achieved by assessing the mean value of the generated sequence in a moving 
window for every consecutive set of 8 trials (i.e., trials 1-8, 2-9, etc). If the mean value of 
those eight trials deviated by more than three points from the underlying mean, the entire 






Choice behavior  
Figure 1 shows the proportion of optimal responses made in each 32-trial epoch for each 
condition. Participants learned to make more optimal responses over time, with a clear 
difference in optimal response rate across the two groups. An ANOVA, with a within-
subjects factor of epoch and between-subjects factor of uncertainty, confirmed this 
interpretation. There was a main effect of epoch, F(7,294) = 22.46, p < .001, ηp
2 = .348, a 
main effect of uncertainty, F(1,42) = 9.68, p < .001, ηp
2 = .187, and a significant interaction 
between epoch and uncertainty, F(7,294) = 2.61, p = .013, ηp
2 = .058, with optimal 
responding increasing at a faster rate for participants in the certain condition compared to 
participants in the uncertain condition. 
Eye gaze  
Figure 2 shows the proportion of trial-time spent looking at the predictive and non-predictive 
cues in each epoch for each condition. We analyzed these data using ANOVA with within-
subjects factors of epoch and predictiveness (predictive vs. non-predictive cue), and a 
between-subjects factor of uncertainty (certain vs. uncertain). We found that fixation time 
decreased across epochs, F(7,266) = 26.69, p < .001, ηp
2 = .413, was significantly higher for 
participants in the uncertain condition than the certain condition, F(1,38) = 12.01, p = .001, 
ηp
2 = .240, and this difference increased across epochs, F(7, 266) = 4.84, p < .001, ηp
2 = .113. 
Greater fixation time was devoted to predictive over non-predictive cues, F(1,38) = 42.83,  
p < .001, ηp
2 = .530. This difference increased across epochs, F(7,266) = 5.12, p < .001,  
ηp
2 = .119, and was greater in the certain condition than the uncertain condition,  
F(1, 38) = 7.73, p = .008, ηp
2 = .169. Despite this, the effect of predictiveness was significant 
in both the certain, F(1, 18) = 29.92, p < .001, ηp





F(1, 20) = 11.39, p = .003, ηp
2 = .363. The three-way interaction in the omnibus ANOVA was 
not significant, F(7, 266) = 1.98, p = .058, ηp
2 = .050.  
Discussion 
Our data suggest that uncertainty promotes an exploratory profile of behavior in both choice 
and attention. Taking first the choice data, we found that participants tended to issue the 
optimal response at a reduced rate under conditions of uncertainty compared to conditions of 
certainty. The limited-feedback procedure used here presents a situation in which changing 
from the optimal to the suboptimal response can be taken to reflect an exploratory response, 
where the participant seeks to gain new knowledge about response payouts. Furthermore, 
unlike in Beesley et al. (2015), where average reward payouts differed substantially between 
certain and uncertain conditions, the current study’s objective mean reward payouts were 
matched across conditions. Our findings therefore suggest that, contrary to previous claims 
(Daw et al., 2006) uncertainty can drive exploration (biasing the EE trade-off) even in the 
absence of marked differences in the expected rewards for different responses. 
Turning to attention, participants in the uncertain condition spent longer looking at 
cues overall (as a proportion of trial time) compared to participants in the certain condition 
(see also Beesley et al. 2015; Easdale et al., 2017; Luque, Vadillo, Le Pelley, & Beesley, 
2017). Participants also spent a greater proportion of trial-time fixating on predictive cues 
over non-predictive cues: this greater attention to more informative cues suggests ‘attentional 
exploitation’. This attentional exploitation was particularly pronounced in the certain 
condition, with strong preferences towards the predictive cue over the non-predictive cue. In 
contrast, participants in the uncertain condition maintained a high level of attention to both 





Our findings fit into an emerging literature on the interaction of learning and attention 
in reinforcement learning. It has been suggested that attention might be used in reinforcement 
learning as a mechanism to solve the problem of stimulus dimensionality (Niv et al., 2015). 
This describes how, when a learning agent is in a complex environment, it must “prune out” 
uninformative stimulus dimensions from attentional processing, while still attending to 
relevant stimulus dimensions. While participants in our study did appear to prune out non-
predictive cues under conditions of certainty, the opposite pattern was observed in 
uncertainty, with all cues receiving increased attention. We propose that this indiscriminate 
increase in attention to cues reflects attentional exploration, while the pruning out of non-
predictive cues from attention reflects attentional exploitation. 
Our findings extend previous work in the learning literature. For example, research in 
category learning has used eye-tracking to show that participants can learn to attend to 
relevant stimulus dimensions and ignore irrelevant dimensions (e.g., Rehder & Hoffman, 
2005; see also Le Pelley et al., 2011), akin to the attentional exploitation demonstrated here 
(though these previous studies did not investigate the effect of manipulating environmental 
uncertainty). More recently, Braunlich and Love (2019) have created the Sampling Emergent 
Attention model of category learning, which postulates that participants can choose to sample 
stimulus dimensions in either an exploitative manner (sampling known relevant dimensions), 
or in an exploratory manner (sampling dimensions that maximize information gain). Notably, 
studies of category learning typically use full-feedback procedures: regardless of the response 
made, participants are told what would have been the ‘correct’ response on each trial. Our 
data suggest that similar processes may operate under the limited-feedback conditions more 
typical of reinforcement learning. This procedure also allowed us to show, for the first time, 
that uncertainty influences the EE trade-off in both attention and choice behavior within the 





To conclude, the current data reflect an intuitive relationship between attention and 
learning. If an agent is satisfied by the reward it will receive from a response, and does not 
expect to gain new information through exploring other responses, it should not expend effort 
attending to stimuli that are not useful to its immediate decision. In contrast, if an agent is 
less sure about the values of its available responses, it should widen its attention in order to 
gather information that may be helpful in making better decisions in the future. It is clear that 
attention is an important component of the behavior within situations that reflect an EE trade-
off, and reinforcement learning more broadly. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Rewards for making response 1 (R1) and response 2 (R2) for the indicated 







Condition Cue compound Reward (R1) Reward (R2) 
    
Certain AX 15 10 
 AY 15 10 
 BX 10 15 
 BY 10 15 
    
Uncertain AX U{9, 21} U{4, 16} 
 AY U{9, 21} U{4, 16} 
 BX U{4, 16} U{9, 21} 





Figure 1: Mean proportion of optimal responses for participants in the certain and uncertain 
conditions. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 








































Figure 2: Mean proportion of trial time spent fixating on predictive (P) and non-predictive 
(NP) cues, for participants in the certain and uncertain conditions. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
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